

CGSOC Class 14-01 Seminar on the “Local Dynamics of War” (Revised 7 Jan 2014)  
R500: Wednesdays and Fridays, 0830-1230, LC4159  
Seminar Leader: Lieutenant Colonel Celestino (Tino) Perez, Jr., Ph.D.

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*“Ask this bull-necked artillery officer what new initiatives get him excited, and he doesn’t talk about new tanks or combat helicopters; in this budget, the Army isn’t getting them. Instead, he talks about a new doctoral program to train officers in strategic planning, and he talks about educating more officers to become experts on Asia and the Middle East, about ‘cultural awareness’ and ‘the human domain.’” -- 22-April 2012, Los Angeles Times op-ed piece by Doyle McManus writing about General Raymond Odierno*

### Course Description

Top military and civilian leaders expect military professionals to operate amidst a range of non-military, political factors. A graduate of CGSOC may help plan a security-cooperation strategy for a combatant commander. She may advise the commander of a joint task force fighting a counterinsurgency. He may plan or execute a humanitarian-assistance mission, a rule-of-law line of effort, or a heavy tank battle. In each of these cases, military and security professionals—to fully understand and smartly intervene in the environment—will need to know how lethal power, governance, economics, culture, religion, identity, and ethics combine to form intractable planning and execution challenges. Yet such knowledge is now a PME shortfall. To address this shortfall, **students in the “Local Dynamics of War” seminar spend six months integrating cutting-edge political science into military planning practices to impart a richer appreciation of the sociopolitical and ethical factors inherent in military operations.**

### MMAS Thesis or Scholarly Paper

Each student will write an MMAS thesis or a scholarly paper under my supervision. This project will integrate the officer’s individual research with the course themes and address a real-world question related to strategic, operational, and tactical levels across the range of military operations and national-security concerns.

### Capstone Planning Exercise

The seminar will include a week-long planning exercise. Under the direction of the seminar leader, students will conduct open-source research, develop a strategic-level assessment, and produce a COA concept that employs military power as part of Unified Action in a real-world area. This planning exercise will enable the students to apply their hard-won knowledge and skill set as they confront a real-world problem using Joint and Army doctrine planning methodologies, as appropriate. Each military professional and Unified Action partner will demonstrate the ability to combine—with utmost rigor—conceptual and detailed planning.

### Specific Student Outcomes

- Officers depart FLKS with a theoretically coherent analytical framework to understand and intervene in the environment; this framework complements military practices
- Officers contribute, via the MMAS thesis or a scholarly paper, to the field with a specific application of the course themes to a real-world strategic/military problem
- Officers develop the intellectual habits of critical and creative thinking and an ethos wholly complementary to Joint and Army Mission Command and Unified Action

## Why “Local Dynamics”?

### From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

- “We operate where our **enemies, indigenous populations, culture, politics, and religion** intersect and where the fog and friction of war persists.” General Martin Dempsey in *Army Capstone Concept*, 2009

### From the Army Capstone Concept, 2012

- “Landpower is the primary means to impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force when necessary; establish and maintain a stable environment that **sets the conditions for political and economic development**; address the consequences of catastrophic events, both natural and manmade, to **restore the infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services**; and support and provide a base from which joint forces can influence and dominate the air and maritime domains of an operational environment.”
- “Decentralized execution guided by the tenets of mission command places increased responsibility on Soldiers to make decisions with strategic, operational, and tactical implications. Employing combined arms teams in this way demands a working knowledge of the environment and an understanding of the **geopolitical, cultural, linguistic, technical, and tactical factors** that impact operations.”
- “**Competition for wealth, resources, political authority, sovereignty, and legitimacy** will produce a variety of conflicts between rapidly evolving and adapting threats in an **increasingly competitive but interconnected world.**”

### From the 2012 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

- “In this **new global political environment**—distinguished by digital networks and worldwide flows of capital, material, people, and information—the geography of threats and crises grow more complex....Taken together, these factors give rise to a future security environment likely to be **more unpredictable, complex, and potentially dangerous** than today.”
- We must “Develop **deep regional expertise.**”

### From current Army Leaders

- “There is no killer app. Understanding the threats and the challenges that confront the United States is **complex work.**” Lieutenant General Mary Legere, 2012
- “The logic for a more complete study of the **human domain** is compelling. The kinds of war most analysts forecast—sometimes called war among the people, other times hybrid warfare or complex contingencies—place a premium on pursuing comprehensive engagement and wider and more constructive partnerships.” Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland and LTC Stuart Farris, 2013

### From our recent wartime experience

- “The tendency to overemphasize detailed information about the enemy at the expense of the **political, economic, and cultural** environment that supports it becomes even more pronounced at the brigade and regional command levels.” Major General Flynn, “Fixing Intel,” 2010
- “Afghan **social, political, economic, and cultural** affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] does not sufficiently appreciate the **dynamics in local communities.**” General McChrystal, 2009
- “Every insurgency is **local**. Therefore, every counterinsurgency has to be local. And you’ve got to understand the dynamics of each village and city. . .you know, we fought in Afghanistan for seven years in seven one-year increments, but the fact is that we didn’t capture—we didn’t develop the sufficiently **granular understanding** of the areas, and that is what this all depends on.” General Petraeus, June 2010

### From U.S. political leaders

- “This is the fundamental challenge the U.S. military will confront: providing the education so that future leaders can understand the **political, strategic, historical, and cultural** framework for a more **complex world**, as well as possess a thorough grounding in the nature of war, past, present, and future.” House Committee on Armed Services, 2010.

### From our historical experience....with major combat operations

- “The story of civil affairs in World War II as it emerges from the documents reveals the effort to perform a mission unprecedented in complexity and size. The mission called for **military, political, and economic activity** on every level—from the job of rebuilding a village bakery to that of rooting out and replacing Fascist and Nazi **ideology and institutions**. The impact and interplay of these activities are highlighted in General Eisenhower’s letter to General Marshall a few weeks after the opening of the North African campaign in 1942: ‘The sooner I can get rid of these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in **political and economic matters.**’ They are highlighted, on a lower plane, in an officer’s problems on first entering a Sicilian town: ‘And what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply damaged. No power. No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town to bury.’” From *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*

### What students will do?

- Increase appreciation for the complexity of the environment. We will replicate complexity in the classroom.
- Improve “political” understanding insofar as *the political* comprises those phenomena that relate to the geographical, historical, cultural, and institutional plurality of human persons living in community. The political includes (among other things) the study of lethal and non-lethal power and its distribution, political regimes, institutions, lawmaking, socio-political cleavages, political behavior, representation, civil society, religious sectarianism, civil-military traditions, moral-ethical traditions, economics, development, rights, legitimacy, justice, and war.
- Inculcate the habit of integrating a multiplicity of scholarly, practitioner, and indigenous perspectives into military planning and execution.
- Appreciate that every mission statement, commander’s intent, campaign plan, and strategy includes implicit and explicit theories about how the world works and how to effect change.
- Increase the military profession’s body of knowledge through individual and collaborative scholarship.

### What the profession of arms and the nation will gain?

- Military professionals who can better serve their staffs, commanders, troopers, and partners across the range of military operations.
  - they can better understand and intervene in a complex environment
  - they can habitually seek out alternative points of view
  - they can integrate expert advice
  - they can operate with an ethos consistent with mission command and unified action
- Officers who—through mentorship and personal example—can improve other military professionals’ understanding, habits, and modes of intervention.

## Grading

Your grade will reflect your effort along three different lines: class contribution (40%), thesis/paper (40%), and a take-home examination (20%).

As you contribute in class by speaking and listening, be self-aware and—as always—be kind.

## Two Routine Collective-Action Problems

First, after each Friday session, one student must craft a blog entry of 500 to 800 words in length. The blog entry, which I will review prior to publication, will appear on the CAC-suite blog, “Arguing the Operational Environment.” The blog entry will summarize and respond to the lesson’s principal themes. Officers, conscious of the potential audiences, should make a special effort to show how the day’s lesson relates civilian scholarship to the work military professionals must do. I should receive the draft by Friday at 1700. Send to [perez.celestino@gmail.com](mailto:perez.celestino@gmail.com). I will post the blog under the student’s name.

Second, every time we discuss an academic journal article or watch a video, I expect someone in our seminar to create a single PowerPoint slide that includes the following items: author/speaker, title, publication/venue, date, principal argument, and (if helpful) a graphic depiction. We will hang these in our classroom and on Blackboard.

## Use of Personal Electronic Devices in the Classroom

The integration of knowledge from a variety of media is integral to your learning and this course. We—as a group—will often find it necessary to look up a fact or reference on the internet. This exercise is fine. However, we must also focus our attention on reflecting upon, discussing, and integrating into a coherent framework the difficult materials that compose our reading list. Hence, I ask that you not use personal electronic devices for other than classroom purposes while we are in session. Put otherwise, I ask that you limit your access to the internet to those very rare occasions when you absolutely must—as an individual—look up a reference or fact. Of course, I approve of and encourage note-taking on an electronic device; however, ensure you are not in “full defilade.”

Seminar Map – Seventeen Weeks

1 The Operational Environment— Views from the Field	2 The Study of Politics—A Problem-Focused Approach	3 Theories of Causation in Politics and War, Part I	4 Theories of Causation in Politics and War, Part II	5 Complexity and Strategic Intervention, Part I
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6 Complexity and Strategic Intervention, Part II	7 Causation Exercise	8 Narratives and Practices in Politics and War, Part I & II	9 Economics and Development—An Institutional Analysis, Part I	10 Economics and Development—An Institutional Analysis, Part II
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11 Application Exercise: <i>Elite Squad</i>	12 <i>Order, Conflict, and Violence</i> – Kalyvas et al.	13 <i>Alliance Formation in Civil Wars</i> - Christia	14 The Logic of Violence in Civil War - Kalyvas	15 Capstone Exercise: <i>The Problem with the Congo</i>
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16 Ethics and the Profession	17 Varieties of Religiosity and Secularity
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## Readings for Friday Seminars

### **Lesson 1                    The Operational Environment: Views from the Field**

Jeffrey Isaac, "Reflections on Scientific Inquiry, Academic Freedom, and Enlightenment," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2011

Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, "Leaving Afghanistan to the Afghans," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 2011

*Helmand Plan Annual Review 2010*, Regional Command South West and Regional Platform South West, 2010 (scan)

Greg Jaffe, "War of persuasion: The Modern U.S. Officer Emerges in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, May 16, 2010

Greg Jaffe, "Combat Generation: Trying to Work with an Afghan Insurgent," *Washington Post*, May 17, 2010

Michael W. Mosser, "Puzzles versus Problems: The Alleged Disconnect between Academics and Military Practitioners," *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 8, Number 4, December 2010

Paul Yingling, "Critical Thinking and its Discontents," *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 8, Number 4, December 2010

Robert Albrow, "Writing Culture Doctrine: Public Anthropology, Military Policy, and World Making," *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 8, Number 4, December 2010

Roland Paris, "Afghanistan: What Went Wrong?" *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 11, Number 2, June 2013

### **Lesson 2                    The Study of Politics: A Problem-Based Approach**

Ian Shapiro, ed., *The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) (selections)

Jeffrey Isaac, "Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique," *Polity*, Volume 20, Number 1, August 1987

Jack S. Levy, "International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War," in Chester Crocker et al., eds., *Leashing the Dogs of War*

### **Lessons 3 and 4            Theories of Causation in Politics and War**

Craig Parsons, *How to Map Arguments in Political Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Rudra Sil, Peter J. Katzenstein, "Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Methods Across Research Traditions," *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 8, Number 2, June 2010

Jeffrey Isaac et al., "Ideology, Realpolitik, and US Foreign Policy: A Discussion of Frank P. Harvey's *Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic, and Evidence*," *Perspectives on Politics*," Volume 11, Number 2, June 2013

Blair S. Williams, "Heuristics and Biases in Military Decision Making," *Military Review*, September-October 2010

## **Lessons 5 and 6      Complexity and Strategic Intervention**

William E. Connolly, *The Fragility of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013)

Robert Jervis, *System Effects* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997)

Michael Walzer, "On Promoting Democracy," *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 22.4, Winter 2008

Timothy Thomas, "China's Cyber Incursions: A Theoretical Look at What They See and Why They Do It Based on a Different Strategic Method of thought" (Google it)

## **Lesson 7                      Causation Exercise: Review Previous Readings**

## **Lesson 8                      Language, Narrative, and Framing in Politics and War, Parts 1 & 2**

Rogers M. Smith, *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) (selections)

Murray Edelman, "Political Language and Political Reality," *PS*, Volume 18, Number 1, Winter 1985

Linda Zerilli, "'We Feel Our Freedom': Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of Hannah Arendt," *Political Theory*, Vol. 22, No. 2, April 2005

Lisa Wedeen, "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, Volume 96, Number 4, December 2002

Jason Glynn and David Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory* (London: Routledge, 2007), Chapter 5

## **Lessons 9 and 10      Economics and Development: An Institutional Analysis**

Clark Gibson et al., *The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)

Mike McGovern, "Popular Development Economics: An Anthropologist among the Mandarins," *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 9, Number 2, June 2011



**Lesson 11**                    **Week-long Application Exercise: Review Previous Readings**

**Lesson 12**                    **Order, Conflict, Violence**

Stathis Kalyvas et al., *Order, Conflict, and Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) (selections)

**Lesson 13**                    **Alliance Formation in Civil Wars**

Fotini Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

**Lesson 14**                    **Logic of Violence in Civil War**

Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

**Lesson 15**                    **Week-long Capstone Exercise: The Problem with the Congo**

Severine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

**Lesson 16**                    **Ethics and Just-War Considerations**

Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer, "Israel: Civilians and Combatants," *The New York Review of Books*, May 14, 2009

Asa Kasher and Major General Amos Yadlin, "Israel & the Rules of War: An Exchange," *The New York Review of Books*, June 11, 2009

Celestino Perez, "The Embedded Morality in FM 3-24," *Military Review*, May/June 2009

Celestino Perez, "The Soldier as Lethal Warrior and Cooperative Political Agent: On the Soldier's Ethical and Political Obligations Toward the Indigenous *Other*," *Armed Forces & Society*, April 2012

**Lesson 17**                    **Varieties of Religion and Secularity**

TBD: Exposure to Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Richard Rorty

Khaled Abou El Fadl et al., *The Place of Tolerance in Islam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002)

Tentative Wednesday-session Foci  
(note: I describe how Wednesdays will run in “Weekly Rhythm” below)

Examples of video and audio recordings we will watch and discuss

Daniel Kahneman, “History and Rationality Lecture Series—Daniel Kahneman,” Hebrew University, December 16, 2006 on Youtube. Start at 2:20. Introduction is in Hebrew. The rest is in English.

Dan Kahneman, “New Ideas @ OSD: The Science of Decision with Daniel Kahneman” (Google Kahneman, DVIDS)

Dan Ariely, “Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions,” Authors@Google Series, July 1, 2008 on Youtube (Authors@Google: Dan Ariely)

Philip Tetlock, “Why Foxes are Better Forecasters than Hedgehogs,” FORA.tv

Scott Page, “Power of Diversity,” FORA.tv

Gideon Rose, “How Wars End,” Conversations in History Series, Youtube

Erica Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: Nonviolence in the Past and Future,” Youtube

Daron Acemoglu, “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty,” Youtube

Paul Collier, “War, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places,” Youtube

Francis Fukuyama, “The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution,” Youtube

Eliot Cohen, “On Giving Strategic Advice to Leaders,” Youtube

Nicholas Christakis, “The Sociological Science Behind Social Networks and Social Influence,” Youtube

Albert Laszlo Barabasi, “TEDMED 2012” (listen to both his presentation and the Q & A, which is a different file)

Albert Laszlo Barabasi, “Networks Understanding Networks, Pt. 6: Albert-Laszlo Barabasi,” Youtube

Phil Arena on Formal Modeling for IR, Duck of Minerva Podcast #2, “Duck of Minerva” blog site (initial portions only)

Vincent Pouliot, Duck of Minerva Podcast #9, “Duck of Minerva” blog site

## Examples of articles we will discuss

Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, "Ethnic Cleavages and Irregular War: Iraq and Vietnam," *Politics & Society*, Vol. 35, No. 2, June 2007.

Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," *American Political Science Review*, Volume 104, Number 3, August 2010

Laia Balcells, "Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 55, Number 3, 2011

Sidney Tarrow, "Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War," *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 5, Number 3, September 2007

James D. Fearon, Kimulikasara, David D. Laitin, "Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset," *The American Political Science Review*, Volume 101, Number 1, February 2007

Havard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 50, Number 4, August 2006

Nicholas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical And Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 45, Number 3, June 2001

Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," *The Journal of Politics*, Volume 63, Number 3, August 2001

Eliot Cohen, "Stephen Biddle on Military Power," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 28, Number 3, June 2005; see also Stephen Biddle's reply.

Sebastian Rosato and John Schuessler, "A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States," *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 9, Number 4, December 2011

Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization* 63, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 2009

Luke N. Condra and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage," *American Journal of Political Science*, Volume 56, Number 1, January 2012

Stathis Kalyvas, "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars," *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 1, Issue 3, 2003

Ivan Arrequin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars," *International Security*, Volume 26, Number 1, Summer 2001.

Patricia L. Sullivan, "War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 51, Number 3, June 2007

Paul Staniland, "States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2012

Lisa Blaydes and Drew Linzer, "Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 106, Number 2, May 2012

Robert Woodberry, "The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 106, Number 2, May 2012

Raphael Franck and Ilia Rainer, "Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 106, Number 2, May 2012

Jessica L. Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 106, Number 2, May 2012

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 10, Number 4, December 2012

Barbara Junisbai, "Improbable but Potentially Pivotal Oppositions: Privatization, Capitalists, and Political Contestation in the Post-Soviet Autocracies," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 10, Number 4, December 2012

Kurt Weyland, "The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?" *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 10, Number 4, December 2012

## Weekly Rhythm

Mondays: I expect that you prepare for our Friday sessions and your thesis.

Wednesdays: Instructor Presentation and MMAS-Thesis/Scholarly Paper Focus

We will meet on Wednesdays for four hours; however, these meetings will generally require no preparation from you (exceptions include Weeks 30, 31, 33). Preparation for our four-hour Friday lessons will require substantial time and reflection; hence, focus on that. I will maintain a flexible approach to Wednesday mornings, which I will use in various ways. Sometimes I will use it to preview an especially difficult aspect of our upcoming Friday material. Early on I will use it to introduce you to certain aspects of rationality, critical thinking, etc. Most often I will use it to present one or two scholarly works that hit upon some aspect of our military profession. As your skills develop, we will begin these sessions with individual, silent reading of a text followed by collaborative work and a discussion. This time period also may accommodate a guest speaker.

Fridays: We will meet once a week on Fridays to discuss the readings. I will issue guidance for each set of readings (things to look for, chapter or article apportionment, preliminary information, etc.). I expect that you do the work specified by the syllabus and my instructions. I expect that you read the material, turn the material over in your mind, wrestle with the material, and craft an approach for how you will participate in class such that your understanding, insights, and questions are efficiently and powerfully brought to the fore. Arrange your note-taking so that you can readily recall the assigned material and—without too much spooling up of your cognitive engines—contribute to the seminar discussion. Some useful questions to guide your preparation include:

- (i) What is the author's argument? What support does the author use?
- (ii) What are some incisive or illustrative quotations?
- (iii) How does the author's work contribute to the work military professionals must do? Strategically? Operationally? Tactically?
- (iv) How does the author's work enhance military professionals' understandings, explanations, and interventions?
- (v) How might you graphically depict the author's argument?
- (vi) How does the author's work complicate the PMESII-PT framework?

## Mandatory Reading – Individual Development

I ask each LDW student to read and digest the follow items, which I believe are central to your development. First, each student should know JP 3-0 and JP 5-0....cold. Second, each student should know ADRP 3-0 and ADRP 5-0....cold. Third, I expect each student to read and be conversant with the posture statements for each of the military services and the combatant commands. You can find these at [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/posture\\_statement.htm](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/posture_statement.htm).

## Good Blog Sites – Individual Development

I consult these five blogs daily.

- Google “Duck of Minerva”
- Google “Political Violence @ a Glance”
- Google “Dan Drezner, Foreign Policy Blog”
- Google “Bookforum.com”
- Google “Understanding Society.blogspot.com”

I consult the following occasionally.

- Google “The Disorder of Things”
- Google “Kings of War”
- Google, “War on the Rocks”
- Google “William Spaniel”
- Google “Suffragio.org”
- Google “Marc Lynch, Foreign Policy Blog”
- Google “Teach for Peace blogspot”
- Google “Five Rupees.com”